Deserving individuals and groups: justifying the shape of South Africa's welfare state by Seekings, Jeremy
CENTRE FOR 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
 
Social Surveys Unit
DESERVING INDIVIDUALS AND 
GROUPS: JUSTIFYING THE SHAPE OF 
SOUTH AFRICA’S WELFARE STATE
Jeremy Seekings
CSSR Working Paper No. 193
May 2007
Jeremy Seekings is Professor of Political Studies and Sociology at the University 
of Cape Town.  He has held visiting appointments at Yale and Oxford universities. 
His books include Heroes or Villains? Youth Politics in South Africa in the 1980s 
(Johannesburg, 1993), The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South 
Africa, 1983-2001 (Cape Town, London and Athens, OH, 2000), and Class, Race and 
Inequality in South Africa (co-authored with Nicoli Nattrass, New Haven and London, 
2005, and Pietermaritzburg, 2006).  From 2001 to 2006 he edited the journal Social 
Dynamics, and is currently co-editor of the International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research.  He is presently conducting research on the politics of welfare state-building 
in developing countries.
Deserving Individuals and Groups:  
Justifying the Shape of South Africa’s 
Welfare State 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The constitution charges the government with the progressive realisation of the 
right of impoverished citizens to income security.  In practice, this means that 
the government must have a reasonable defence of the current size and shape of 
its social welfare programmes.  Legal challenges have pushed the state into 
offering such a defence.  In summary, the state justifies the current size and 
shape of the welfare state primarily on the grounds that the state is targeting its 
scarce resources on the most ‘disadvantaged’ groups, where disadvantage is 
defined in terms of past opportunity not of current need.  In this view, the public 
welfare system should help those groups of people who had fewest opportunities 
to provide for themselves.  This argument entails a new version of the distinction 
between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor.  The state’s application of this 
argument in recent court papers is flawed empirically, but in making the 
argument the state has provided a basis for constructive debate on the shape of 
the welfare state. 
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The Size and Shape of the Welfare State 
 
Both in the last years of apartheid and since 1994, South African government 
ministers have insisted that South Africa does not and should not have a 
‘welfare state’.  Ministers from the African National Congress (ANC) in post-
1994 governments use the same discourse as their predecessors before 1994 in 
National Party governments.  They bemoan both the financial costs of 
‘handouts’ and the social and economic costs in terms of the ensuing ‘culture of 
dependency and entitlement’.  They prefer the imagery of the ‘developmental’ 
state to that of the welfare state, and seek to shift from non-contributory 
programmes (social assistance) to contributory ones.  At the same time, as ANC 
ministers are quick to point out when it suits them, government spending on 
these social assistance programmes has grown rapidly, from about 2 percent to 
about 3.5 percent of GDP between 1994 and 2006.  No other developing country 
redistributes as large a share of its GDP through social assistance programmes.1  
Expenditure doubled in real terms (i.e. taking inflation into account) between 
1994 and 2004.  By mid-2006, about 11 million grants were being paid each 
month, in a country with a total population of only 45 million people.  One in 
four South Africans was receiving a pension or grant financed out of general 
taxation (see Figure 1).2  In terms of expenditure and coverage, South Africa 
already has a remarkable, pro-poor ‘welfare state’, albeit one that is not 
comprehensive in terms of either coverage of the poor or the range of ‘risks’ 
against which people are protected. 
 
Figure 1: Social assistance beneficiaries 
(millions) and expenditures (in 2000 prices, 
R billion), 1993-2006/07
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1 Expenditure rose in Brazil under the Cardoso and Lula governments, and to a lesser extent in Mexico, but both 
still lag far behind South Africa in terms of expenditure as a share of GDP. 
2 Figures 1 to 3 are based on data provided by Pakade (2006) and data from various issues of the annual Budget 
Review and Inter-governmental Fiscal Review, published by the National Treasury. 
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Figure 2: Real value of social assistance grants, Jan 1994-
Feb 2007
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
R
an
ds
 p
er
 m
on
th
 (2
00
0 
pr
ic
es
)
old age pension child support grant foster care grant state maintenance grant (parent plus one child)
 
 
 
Rising expenditure on social assistance has not due to the rising value of 
benefits.  Figure 2 shows the maximum value of each of the major grants, in 
constant (2000) prices.  These are the maxima, because the grants are means-
tested.  Grants have been raised intermittently, declining in value due to inflation 
in between raises.  The real value of the old-age pension (paid to men and 
women from the ages of 60 and 65 respectively, subject to a means test) 
declined until mid-2003, and then rose, but is yet to attain its value at the 
beginning of 1994.  The disability and care dependency grants (paid to the 
disabled and caregivers to disabled children) have been set at the same amount 
as the old-age pension.  The foster care grant (paid to court-recognised foster 
parents) shows a similar pattern.  The real value of the old-age pension and most 
of the other grants has not changed greatly since 1994.  The maximum value of 
the old-age pension relative to GDP per capita – which has grown steadily – is 
still significantly lower than it was in 1994.  
 
The exception to the general pattern is the state maintenance grant, which was 
the old apartheid-era system of financial support for families with poor children.  
Only available to people outside of the Bantustans, negligible numbers of 
African people ever received the grant.  The Lund Committee recommended that 
the state maintenance grant, which was generous but reached few poor people, 
be replaced by a child support grant, which would be much less generous but 
would therefore be able to reach many more poor people without a massive 
explosion in total expenditure (South Africa, 1996; Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: 
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362).  Figure 2 shows that the child support grant was introduced at a low level 
in 1998 whilst the state maintenance grant was phased out over three years. 
 
 
Figure 3: Numbers of social assistance beneficiaries, 1993-06, by 
programme (millions)
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Overall coverage has grown because of rapid growth in one programme and 
some growth in a second.  Figure 3 shows that there was little change in the 
number or pattern of beneficiaries until 2000.  Thereafter there was an 
extraordinary explosion in the number of beneficiaries, but this was almost 
entirely due to the growth of child support grants being paid out.  The child 
support grant, although modest in value, very quickly reached ten times the 
number of children reached by its predecessor, the state maintenance grant.  By 
April 2006, about 7 million child support grants were paid monthly, compared to 
just 230,000 child allowances under the state maintenance grant at the peak year 
of 1998.  Figure 3 also shows the slow but significant rise in disability grants, 
due to growing numbers of claimants that is probably the consequence of AIDS 
(see Nattrass, 2006).   
 
The growth in the number of child support grants being paid out is partly due to 
rising take-up rates among eligible groups, and partly because of the expanding 
ambit of eligibility.  When the child support grant was introduced, it was limited 
to children up to (and including) the age of six.  From April 2003, children aged 
seven and eight years became eligible.  From April 2004, children aged nine and 
ten became eligible.  And from April 2005, children aged eleven, twelve and 
thirteen became eligible. 
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The pattern of expenditures has also changed, although less dramatically than 
the changing numbers of beneficiaries.  Total expenditure has risen because of 
rising expenditure on child support and disability grants.  In 2002-03, old-age 
pensions counted for more than one-half of all social assistance (and it was 
therefore still the case that ‘the single most important instrument of 
redistribution via the budget is the old-age pension’ (Seekings and Nattrass, 
2005: 360)).  But by 2006-07, old-age pensions only accounted for 37 percent of 
all social assistance expenditure, whilst child support grants accounted for 31 
percent and disability grants accounted for 25 percent.  The government’s 
projections envisage that the old-age pension will remain the largest single 
programme in terms of cost, at least until the age of eligibility for the child 
support grant is raised above fourteen, but it is does not dominate the social 
assistance system in the way that it did for the whole of the twentieth century. 
 
Social assistance programmes mitigate significantly poverty among groups of 
deserving poor – the elderly, the disabled, and children – and among their 
dependents more broadly (Samson, 2002; Bhorat, 2003).  The three categories of 
deserving poor comprise people who cannot work on the grounds of either age 
or disability.  The social assistance system makes no provision for able-adults of 
working age, i.e. between the ages of sixteen (the age at which young people can 
leave school) and sixty or sixty-five (the ages at which women and men 
respectively become eligible for the old-age pension).  (The absence of any 
provision for children aged fourteen or fifteen is the starkest anomaly in the 
design of the social assistance system.)  Many adults of working age benefit 
indirectly from social assistance programmes in that they are the dependents of 
the recipients of the grants.  The state has chosen to focus its efforts on poor 
adults of working age on public works programmes, which are supposed to 
provide the poor with the ‘dignity of work’. 
 
The design of the social assistance system – including public works programmes 
– reflects a classic ‘northern’ conceptions of desert, i.e. the conception that 
underlies the design of welfare states in most of the global North.  Those poor 
who are unable to work should be assisted, but those of working age must go out 
and earn a living (or be dependent on a breadwinner, for example through 
marriage).  This design makes sense if two conditions are met.  First, 
unemployment must be low, whether through Keynesian macro-economic 
policies, active labour market policies or American-style growth of low-wage 
employment.  Secondly, working people can insure themselves against the risk 
of short-term unemployment or joblessness because of poor health through 
contributory welfare programmes.  A third condition is of a lesser importance: 
Enough working people provide for their own retirement through contributory 
pension schemes that the cost of paying pensions is sustainable.   
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None of these conditions pertain to South Africa.  South Africa has the world’s 
highest unemployment rates, at just under 30 percent or closer to 40 percent 
depending on the choice of definition (with the ‘expanded’ definition being 
more appropriate in the South African context).  South Africa has a very 
unevenly developed contributory welfare system that provides little insurance 
against risk for most working people.  And very few working people receive a 
significant pension after retirement from the contributory pension schemes.  The 
results are that the long-term unemployed in South Africa generally receive no 
financial support from state or any formal scheme, and most people on 
retirement are dependent on the state’s tax-funded old-age pension. 
 
Non-contributory, tax-financed social assistance programmes are the first 
distinctive feature of South Africa’s welfare system.  The second distinctive 
feature is its peculiar contributory welfare system.  Unlike most middle-income 
countries in the South – such as Brazil or Argentina – South Africa has a 
minimal system of formal social insurance.  There is no direct legal obligation of 
employees in even the formal sector to contribute to retirement funds or medical 
aid schemes.  Social insurance is limited primarily to unemployment insurance 
through the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF).3  Formal sector employers 
and employees, including agricultural and domestic employers/workers, are 
required to contribute to the UIF.  But total benefits paid by the UIF amount to 
well under 1 percent of GDP, and only reach a small proportion of the 
unemployed because only former contributors are eligible for benefits (and only 
for a short period).   
 
But the absence of any major formal social insurance does not mean there is no 
contributory welfare system, nor that the state plays no part in it.  ‘Private 
sector’ pension and provident funds pay out in benefits each year almost double 
what the state pays out through its social assistance programmes.  These funds 
provide massive benefits in the event of unemployment to formal sector 
employees at risk, and retirement benefits to those formal sector employees who 
reach retirement age without having had to withdraw their benefits prematurely 
(Van der Merwe, 2004; South Africa, 2007).  In total, these funds pay out in 
benefits each year the equivalent of about 5 percent of GDP, or considerably 
more than the social assistance system. Describing these funds as ‘private 
sector’ funds obscures two respects in which the state is very involved. First, the 
largest fund – the million-member Government Employees’ Pension Fund – is 
for government employees, funded largely by the government.  Secondly, 
membership of pension and provident funds is mandatory for employees in 
many sectors or industries, because the state extends across entire industries or 
sectors the agreements reached between employers and trade unions through 
                                                 
3 The Compensation Fund also insures employees against occupational disease, and the Road Accident Fund 
insures all South Africans against road accidents wrongfully caused by third parties.  
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collective bargaining.  All employees in the mining industry, for example, are 
required to be members of either the old Mine Employees Pension Fund or the 
newer Mineworkers Provident Fund.  South African thus has a substantial 
system of semi-social insurance, which provides a range of benefits to formal 
sector employees.  But this semi-social insurance system provides no benefits to 
those poor adults whose participation in the formal sector is intermittent or 
short-lived or non-existent. 
 
Both the social assistance and semi-social insurance sides of the welfare state 
are subject to political pressure, but the politics of each is distinct.  The 
government’s most recent proposed reforms of the contributory system (South 
Africa, 2007) will probably prompt serious dispute.  Whilst there is a lack of 
research on South Africa’s contributory welfare system, and the politics thereof, 
this paper concentrates on the social assistance system.  The contributory system 
provides for people who, by definition, are or were employed and were or are 
relatively privileged.  In contemporary South Africa, it is the social assistance 
system that is the part of the welfare state aimed at the poor, and is therefore 
subject to constitutional review.  
 
 
Pressures for Change in Public Welfare 
 
There is a rich comparative literature on welfare state-building and the politics 
of welfare state retrenchment (see Hicks and Esping-Andersen, 2006, for a 
review).  The two dominant, and not mutually exclusive approaches, emphasise 
political institutions and class struggles respectively.  The institutionalist 
approach is most compelling as an explanation of the case of the USA, where 
constitutional checks and balances have served as a check on the growth of the 
welfare state.  Even in the USA, however, explanations rooted in class struggle 
have become more compelling, with attention being paid to the politics of 
coalition-building between diverse classes (including employers themselves, as 
well as middle and working classes).  In South Africa, as in most of the global 
South, the history of welfare state-building has been one primarily of reforms 
from above, by elites concerned to co-opt or pacify particular constituencies of 
beneficiaries.  South Africa’s centralized political institutions have facilitated 
reform, and continue to do so.  But the impetus to reform has generally been 
internal to the state itself. 
 
This continues to be the case today.  Welfare reform is not a major electoral 
issue.  The ANC is surely wary of alienating its voters by retrenching welfare 
programmes, but the ANC’s entrenched electoral dominance means that it faces 
little immediate electoral incentive to expand the welfare system.  South Africa 
is, in this respect, very different to many other countries, including Brazil, 
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Mexico and South Korea, where there have been and are strong electoral 
pressures to expand the social welfare system.  Nor, in South Africa, is there 
much pressure from outside the electoral system.  In the early 2000s, non-
government organizations led by the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) called for a basic income grant (see chapters in Standing and 
Samson, 2003; also Makino, 2004).  But the issue of much less importance to 
COSATU than many other issues.  The unions exert some influence through the 
ANC Alliance, especially during the current leadership struggle, but they are 
unlikely to throw much effort into the expansion of social assistance (Matisonn 
and Seekings, 2003). 
 
The absence of strong pressures is the reason why, despite growth in both 
expenditures and the numbers of beneficiaries, ANC-led governments have 
introduced no fundamentally new social assistance programmes since 1994.  
The post-apartheid welfare state comprises programmes that were introduced in 
the early twentieth century.  The three key programmes – old-age pensions, 
disability grants, and support for poor families with children – were introduced 
not by the post-apartheid state, nor even by the apartheid state, but by the pre-
apartheid state, prior to 1948.  The growth of the welfare state in terms of 
expenditure and beneficiaries, especially in the 1980s and early 1990s, and then 
again in the early 2000s, entailed rising expenditures on existing programmes 
rather than the introduction of new programmes.4  Even the much-vaunted 
introduction of child support grants in the late 1990s was, in reality, simply a 
reform – certainly, an important and pro-poor reform – of an existing 
programme. 
 
The attitude towards social assistance within the ANC leadership and 
government has, for the most part, been one mixed ambivalence and hostility.  
This was clear even in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), 
which served as the ANC’s election manifesto in 1994.  The ANC promised 
voters ‘a better life for all’, but this would explicitly not be based on social 
assistance primarily.  ‘Although a much stronger welfare system is needed to 
support all of the vulnerable, the old, the disabled and the sick who currently 
live in poverty, a system of “handouts” for the unemployed should be avoided’ 
(ANC, 1994: 18).  The emphasis should rather be developmental, i.e. on 
providing the poor with skills and opportunities so that they could support 
themselves.  This developmental approach to social welfare was given 
expression in the 1997 White Paper on Social Development (South Africa, 
1997), and the subsequent renaming of the Department of Welfare as the 
Department of Social Development.  The priority attached to an developmental 
approach, and an aversion to the ‘welfare state’, continues to dominate 
                                                 
4 Both scholars (such as Case and Deaton, 199x) and the post-1994 government (e.g. Manuel, 1999; South 
Africa, 2003) have mistakenly claimed that pro-poor welfare spending only became significant after 1994. 
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government and ANC documents (South Africa, 2006; ANC, 2007; see also 
Meth, 2005). 
 
But the government and ANC have to maintain some balance between a 
developmental approach and calls for a ‘comprehensive’ welfare system.  Both 
the RDP and the 1997 White Paper referred to the need for a ‘comprehensive’ 
welfare system.  In 2000, government appointed Committee of Inquiry into a 
Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa, chaired by Vivienne 
Taylor. The Taylor Committee’s central recommendation was that a modest 
‘basic income grant’ be introduced, on a phased basis and conditional on 
administrative efficacy (South Africa, 2002; see Seekings, 2002; Standing and 
Samson, 2003; Makino, 2004). The Taylor Committee’s arguments for the basic 
income grant were framed in large part in terms of the South African 
constitution, which has turned out to be a – and perhaps the – major source of 
pressure on the government. 
 
The South African constitution includes a bold vision of the public welfare 
system. Section 27 specifies that: 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to … (c) social security, 
including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependents, appropriate social assistance.  
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of 
each of these rights. 
The Constitutional Court has generally interpreted its constitutional role not so 
much in terms of direct interference with the policy-making powers of the 
executive and legislature, but in promoting a culture of justification, through 
requiring that the executive justify its policies (in terms of its constitutional 
obligations).  Under pressure to justify why some citizens are deemed eligible 
for social assistance and others not, the post-apartheid state has slowly moved 
towards an explicit account of the size and shape of the social assistance system. 
 
 
Initial State Responses to Legal Challenge 
 
The first cases involving social or economic rights that came before the 
constitutional court focused on access to public health or housing.  It was only in 
2003 that the first major case concerning social assistance reached the court.  In 
2003, the Constitutional Court heard arguments on two cases challenging the 
ineligibility of certain non-citizens for social assistance.  Both cases were 
brought by Mozambicans who were permanent residents in South Africa.  The 
applicants in the first case – Louis Khosa and two others – would have been 
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eligible for the old-age pension except that they were not South African citizens.  
Saleta Mahlaule and her co-applicant in the second case would have been 
eligible for the child support grant and care dependency grant had they been 
South African citizens.  The state conceded that the mothers (or care-givers) of 
children who are South African citizens – such as Mahlaule – should not be 
denied access to child-support grants, even if they were not South African 
citizens themselves.  But the state argued that it was reasonable to discriminate 
against Khosa and other non-citizens with respect to the old-age pensions, given 
that resources were constrained and citizens should be prioritised.  In 2004, two 
members of the court found in favour of the state, but seven found against it.  
Justice Mokgoro’s majority judgement emphasised the constitutional 
commitment to building ‘a caring society’.  Non-citizens who had been allowed 
into the country and given permanent resident status should not be abandoned 
‘to destitution if they fall upon hard times’ and – as in the case of the elderly and 
children – are unable to earn a living for themselves.  The state should not force 
them into ‘relationships of dependency upon families, friends and the 
community in which they live’ (Mokgoro, 2004: 41, 48). 
 
In defending the logic of social assistance provision in Khosa and Mahlaule, the 
state emphasised strongly the size or cost of the system.  It argued that 
expenditure had risen and coverage expanded (as shown in Figure 1 above), and 
suggested that this amounted to the fulfilment of its constitutional obligations.  
The irony is that the state resisted a legal case for expanding expenditure (by, at 
most, R0.7m) at the same time as it congratulated itself on expanding 
expenditure in the past (by many times this sum).  The state said nothing about 
the shape of the system (Kruger, 2003; Madonsela, 2003).   
 
At much the same time, however, the state was beginning to develop elsewhere 
an argument about the shape of the system as it expanded.  When it announced 
the extension of the child support grant beyond the age of six, the Department of 
Social Development noted that ‘Constitutional Court rulings have made it clear 
that Government needs to take into account the urgent needs of the most 
vulnerable.  This implies a targeted, and in this instance, phased approach to the 
extension of access to Government services (grants) to ensure equitable 
extension’ (South Africa, 2003: 1).  Implicitly, the expansion of the welfare state 
should be ‘equitable’, in terms of targeting the ‘most vulnerable’.  In 2006, the 
Department of Social Development’s Strategic Plan (South Africa, 2006) 
committed the department to developing a ‘costed plan for progressive access to 
social assistance’ by September 2006.  This promised to explain the logic of the 
welfare state, and of its prospective expansion.  But, as of early 2007, there is no 
sign in public of any such plan.   
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It was to take another court case to push the state – through the Department of 
Social Development – to set out for the first time a fuller statement of the logic 
of the welfare system.  The application in Roberts and Others vs the Minister of 
Social Development and Others (henceforth Roberts) was filed in May 2006.  
The four applicants were men aged between 62 and 64 years, who were too 
young to be eligible for an old-age pension, although women of the same age 
were eligible.  All four lived in the formerly coloured group area of Gelvandale, 
in Port Elizabeth.  Christian Roberts, the first applicant, had been unemployed 
for more than ten years, but his family did receive other grants (his wife 
received an old-age pension, and they received a child foster grant for one of 
their grandchildren).  Nonetheless, Roberts said, ‘My wife and I struggle to live 
a decent life and some days close to the day of her next grant payment, the 
family goes hungry.   Our dignity is impaired by this life-style of poverty…’  
The second applicant, Neville Whitebooi, was even more atypical of poor men 
of his age.  He had retired from his job as a machine operator at the age of 60, in 
part due to poor health.  After 27 years of employment, he had received a 
pension payout of about R120,000, and unemployment benefits for a short 
period.  He spent his pension payout on settling debts, improving his house, and 
meeting daily living expenses.  Now he had no cash income.  The applicants 
argued that their exclusion from eligibility for an old-age pension simply on the 
grounds of gender was unconstitutional.  Roberts stated that he was ‘a black 
South African’ who had been subject to discriminatory laws and policies.  He 
emphasized that he had been compelled to leave school early because he had to 
take over the role of breadwinner when his father took ill.  In his view, he had 
not been more privileged than women of his age who were now eligible for the 
old-age pension.  
 
The state’s argument in Roberts covered both the size and the shape of the social 
assistance system.  The size, according to the state, is limited by resource 
constraints, which are recognized as salient in the South African constitution.  
Any extension of social assistance would require additional expenditure.  
Reducing the age of eligibility for the old-age pension for men, from sixty-five 
to sixty years, would cost an estimated R3.3 billion (including administrative 
costs) (Pakade, 2006: 104).  Even without any reform of the existing social 
assistance system, expenditures would rise, for example on foster care and 
related grants because of HIV/AIDS (ibid: 118).  As the population ages, so the 
cost of old-age pensions rises – as Simkins (2005) has shown in work for the 
National Treasury, leading him and the National Treasury to conclude that the 
present social assistance system is unsustainable.  But the state has not set out 
any rationale explaining what is an appropriate total sum of public expenditure 
on social assistance, or what precisely are the costs of raising further the share of 
GDP or of government expenditure transferred to the poor through social 
assistance. Critics suggest that there is scope for increased expenditure (Samson, 
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2002), but there is no easy way of resolving debates over the optimal or correct 
level of public expenditure. Of more immediate importance is the very low 
likelihood that the Constitutional Court would comment on the total sum spent.  
In terms of the Constitutional Court, the state’s justification of the size of the 
social assistance system is much less important than its justification of its shape. 
 
 
Disadvantage and Desert 
 
The shape of social assistance is – according to the state (Pakade, 2006) – the 
result of choices made by the government in fulfilling its constitutional 
obligations, in terms of identifying groups that are especially deserving of public 
assistance.  The basic conceptual framework is not set out explicitly or clearly, 
but it seems to entail five key elements.  The first three of these set out a 
normative framework.  First, the welfare state should be designed on the basis of 
desert, i.e. of how deserving is any particular applicant.  Secondly, desert should 
not be defined simply in terms of individual need (through a means test, for 
example) but rather in terms of previous disadvantage, i.e. whether any person 
or category of persons had an equitable opportunity to provide for themselves.  
In the state’s view, the means test alone is an insufficient measure of desert.  
Thirdly, disadvantage either (a) should be defined or (b) can only be defined in 
terms of membership of a group of people who experienced common 
disadvantage. 
‘The distinctiveness of social assistance lies in its emphasis of risks 
and vulnerability as the main factors behind poverty and deprivation.  
In formulating social assistance strategies, it is incumbent upon the 
state to identify the key risks affecting groups of people, and the 
policy interventions which could help such groups prevent, 
ameliorate, or cope with the materialization of these risks.’ (ibid: 22-3; 
emphasis added) 
The elderly, for example, are regarded as a deserving group because they are 
disadvantaged by the worsening opportunities for employment and worsening 
health associated with old age.  They also remain disadvantaged because of the 
disadvantages experienced in the past, which restricted their ability to provide 
themselves for their retirement (ibid: 24-25). 
 
The final two elements of the state’s conceptual framework concern how the 
normative framework is translated into practice.  Fourthly, the state claims that it 
is currently assessing and identifying correctly which are the most deserving 
groups in society.  Fifth, the state claims that the disadvantage experienced by 
groups can be demonstrated empirically using quantitative data from surveys 
and censuses, i.e. through the statistical profiling of groups.  In summary, the 
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state argues that it is justified in using its scarce resources in targeting its social 
assistance programmes on the basis of the statistical profiling of groups and their 
respective relative disadvantage and desert. 
 
This framework was elaborated – and applied – in the specific context of the 
Roberts case.  Opposing the extension of social assistance to cover men aged 60-
64, the state argued that this group of men was not deserving because they are 
not or have not been sufficiently disadvantaged.  Elderly men are not or have not 
been as disadvantaged as elderly women.  The Department of Social 
Development claimed that it allocates resources in light of ‘the Constitutional 
and policy commitment to achieving gender equality, which includes improving 
women’s position relative to that of men. … Policy which targets society’s most 
vulnerable, at least as a starting point, corresponds to the obligation placed on 
the state, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of 
the right to appropriate social assistance of those who are unable to support 
themselves and their dependents’ (ibid: 26-7). 
‘It is my respectful contention that elderly poor women are in many 
respects among South Africa’s most vulnerable groups.  Their current 
situation and the opportunities open to them reflect their years of 
living in a racist and sexist society.  Their circumstances today reflect 
the effects of the structural conditions that underpin long-term poverty 
dynamics: asset poverty, employment vulnerability, and subjection to 
unequal social power relations. … [T]he old age pension is a measure 
designed to protect such women, as well as one which contributes to 
the constitutional goal of achieving equality to ensure their full and 
equal enjoyment of all rights.’ (ibid: 27) 
The state does not provide any indication as to what are the other ‘most 
vulnerable groups’ in South Africa.  They presumably include children and the 
disabled, but no evidence is presented that allows for an ordering of the 
disadvantage experienced by different people or ‘groups’ of people. 
 
What the state does provide is detailed empirical data purporting to show that 
elderly women (typically or on average) ‘are substantially disadvantaged in 
comparison to men’ (of the same age) (ibid: 34, emphasis added), in terms of a 
long series of indicators.  These include education and functional literacy, past 
and present employment, whether or not they are the reported ‘household head’, 
marital status (with women being very much more likely to be widowed, whilst 
men are much more likely to be married), responsibility for unpaid household 
work (which limits labour force participation), health, and access to housing and 
services.  The state concluded that ‘a rational relationship exists between the 
differentiation made in the legislation, and the relative need of elderly men and 
women for social assistance’ (ibid: 5). 
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The data on the disadvantage faced by elderly women (as a group) relative to 
elderly men (as a group), drawn from censuses, surveys and secondary studies, 
are not incorrect.  But aspects of the interpretation of these data are open to 
question.  Whether the data indicate ‘substantial’ relative disadvantage depends 
on how ‘substantial’ is to be defined, as sometimes the gender differences are 
small, sometimes large.  Other measures might be selected which show that men 
are in certain respects more disadvantaged than women.  Most obviously, men 
suffer from worse health and die (on average) at a much younger age.  
Nonetheless, as the affidavit states with reference to household chores, it is 
clearly the case that ‘the present generation of elderly women are in most cases 
experiencing the effects of a lifetime of unpaid labour’ at the same time as being 
disadvantaged right now in terms of access to paid employment opportunities 
and so on.  On average, elderly women have not and do not face the same 
opportunities as men to provide for themselves in their old age. 
 
The state’s conclusion to this survey of data is that elderly women ‘are 
substantially more vulnerable than comparable men’ (ibid: 88, emphasis added).  
Giving the pension to women aged 60-64 but not men of the same age helps to 
give women resources that men have from other sources. 
‘… the provision of the old age pension to women aged from 60 to 64 
diminishes the inequality between such women and comparable men, 
and between such women and all other persons aged above 65 who are 
eligible for social assistance.  The legislative differentiation has been 
maintained to provide social assistance to the most vulnerable group 
of elderly persons, whose vulnerability is the result of historical and 
societal unfair discrimination.’ (ibid: 120) 
The state noted that the first applicant, unlike most women of his age, had been 
employed for much of his life, and had even benefited from private pension and 
unemployment benefits (ibid: 136).  More importantly, the state argued, the 
various hardships experienced by the first applicant were much more common 
among elderly women than among elderly men.  Gender-based targeting was, 
therefore, appropriate. 
 
 
An Empirical Critique 
 
The key weakness in the state’s framework – and its application in the Roberts 
case – is whether grouping diverse people into just two categories, ‘men’ and 
‘women’, is a defensible way of assessing disadvantage, need and desert.  In the 
Khosa case, the Constitutional Court accepted that ‘it is necessary to 
differentiate people between people and groups of people in society by 
classification in order for the state to allocate rights, duties, immunities, 
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privileges, benefits or even disadvantages’.  But ‘those classifications must 
satisfy the constitutional requirement of “reasonableness” … [and] 
differentiation, if it is to pass constitutional muster, must not be arbitrary or 
irrational …’ (Mokgoro, 2004: 33).   
 
The state’s argument rests on the comparison between the statistical profile of 
elderly men and elderly women (and to some men and women of all ages) in 
terms of need and (especially) past ‘disadvantage’.  This is an inappropriate 
comparison.  The appropriate comparison is not between elderly men and 
women in general, but rather between those elderly men and women whose 
individual means fall below the level set in the means test.  Discrimination 
against men is reasonable, in terms of the state’s proposed framework of linking 
desert to disadvantage, if the elderly men whose incomes are below the means 
test income threshold are more advantaged than elderly women with similarly 
low incomes.  But the state reports that almost one in three men between the 
ages of 60 and 64 have earnings or assets that would render them means-
ineligible for an old-age pension if the current provisions for women were 
replicated for men (Pakade, 2006: 103).  These men need to be excluded from 
the comparative analysis of disadvantage, as would the few women of the same 
age who are means-ineligible for the pension.  Including means-ineligible men 
and women serves to distort the relative mean values for earnings, education, 
participation in the labour market in the past (especially the recent past), and so 
on.   
 
The state attempted to get around this problem in Roberts by presenting data on 
the characteristics not only of men and women in the 60-64 age group, but also 
for African men and women in this age group on the grounds that racial 
categorization is a proxy for low income.  The state does not discuss whether or 
not the use of race is indeed a good proxy for low income.  Insofar as the 
proportion of African men in this age group with earnings that make them 
means-ineligible is larger than the equivalent proportion of African women, and 
especially if higher income African men earn more than higher income African 
women, then even this ‘proxy group’ data will be a poor guide to the actual 
disadvantage of the poor.  The state itself concedes that almost one-third of 
African men in the 60-64 year-old age group but almost no African women of 
this age have employment (ibid: 43, Table 6), suggesting that the state’s ‘proxy 
group’ might not be a very good one.  Men with jobs are not only less needy, but 
also probably less ‘disadvantaged’ than jobless men of the same age.   
 
A more precise specification of means-eligible men and women produces a 
rather different picture of the relative ‘disadvantage’ of elderly men and women.  
The 2005 General Household Survey (GHS) recorded earnings and income data 
in terms of broad income brackets, but combining the brackets up to a R18,000 
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p.a. provides a reasonably good approximation of the actual means-test income 
threshold of R20,232 p.a. for unmarried people.  Using this measure, 20 percent 
of African men aged 60-64 and a negligible proportion of similarly-aged African 
women are means-ineligible for the old-age pension.  The effect of separating 
out these means-ineligible men is clear if we look at data on education, which 
are arguably the more important data for the state’s argument about the relative 
disadvantage of elderly women as a group.  The GHS data show that 39 percent 
of African women aged 60-64 received no education, compared to 33 percent of 
African men of the same age.  This is the kind of evidence presented by the state 
to show that women were or are disadvantaged.  But the proportion of means-
eligible African men aged 60-64 who had no education was 37 percent (whilst 
only 14 percent of means-ineligible African men had no education).  In other 
words, the difference between the educational backgrounds of means-eligible 
African men and women is insignificant (2 percentage points), whilst the 
difference between means-eligible elderly people and means-ineligible elderly 
people is big.   
 
 
 
The distribution of disadvantage – using education as the measure of 
disadvantage – is shown in Table 1 and Figures 4 and 5.  Figure 4 shows the 
distribution as the state presents it in Roberts: the distribution for African men is 
(marginally) to the right of the distribution for African women, indicating 
relative advantage.  Figure 5 shows the distribution using the more precise 
specification of means-eligibility.  The distributions for means-eligible African 
men and women are almost indistinguishable, whilst the distribution for means-
ineligible African men is far to the right. 
 
 
Table 1: Educational attainment of African men and women aged 60-64 
Education level All African men 
(%) 
Means-eligible 
African men (%) 
Means-ineligible 
African men (%) 
All African 
women (%) 
None 33 37 14 39 
Primary 26 27 23 25 
Incomplete 
secondary 
32 29 45 31 
Matric 2 1 4 1 
Post-matric 8 6 13 3 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: 2005 GHS data, my calculations.  Note that some totals do not come to exactly 100 
because of rounding errors. 
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Figure 4: Educational attainment of African men 
and women aged 60-64
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Figure 5: Educational attainment of African 
men and women aged 60-64
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Figures 4 and 5 also show starkly another problem with the state’s arguments.  If 
disadvantage is measured in terms of schooling, then there are many men who 
are currently excluded from the old-age pension who have less schooling than 
many of the women who currently receive the pension.  The 37 percent of 
means-eligible African men aged 60-64 with no schooling are more 
disadvantaged than the 61 percent of African women with some schooling. 
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This analysis can be repeated for almost every measure of disadvantage that the 
state discusses in Roberts (Seekings, 2006).  There is insufficient basis in survey 
and census data for characterizing means-eligible African men aged 60-64 as 
being any less disadvantaged than African women of the same age.   
 
The underlying argument that the state makes in Roberts is that some groups of 
people faced better opportunities to provide for their old-age, and that these 
advantages make them less deserving of social assistance.  This can be 
illustrated in terms of descriptions of typical members of the supposedly 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups.  A man, born in the rural Eastern Cape 
around 1940, who received little or no schooling, spent much of his adult life 
working for low wages on intermittent migrant contracts down the gold-mines, 
was lucky enough not to die or be injured in a rockfall or contract a severe case 
of a mining-related disease, remitted much of his wage back to his family in the 
Eastern Cape, was retrenched in the 1980s, and was unable to find any further 
employment and spent the past fifteen years unemployed, is deemed advantaged, 
and hence undeserving.5  A woman, born at the same time and the same place, 
had the same schooling, but never left the Eastern Cape; she never had the same 
opportunity to work down a gold-mine and relied on the remittances sent by her 
husband, supplemented by her own irregular earnings from occasional low-wage 
employment in the area; she is deemed disadvantaged and hence deserving.  
Distinguishing between the disadvantages experienced by men and women like 
these appears to be as normatively bankrupt as it is empirically difficult.  
 
 
Social Benefits and Desert  
 
The state employs a second argument in Roberts that moves in a different 
direction.  The state declares that old-age pensions have both an immediate 
objective – ‘to alleviate hardship among older people’ – and a broader objective 
to help to tackle aggregate poverty, in that elderly pensioners support many 
other poor people in their households (Pakade, 2006: 24-6).  Data are presented 
showing that elderly women are much more likely than elderly men to care 
actively for grandchildren, and thus subsidise them out of the pension.  Elderly 
women spend money in more poverty-reducing ways than elderly men, and 
probably ‘bear the brunt of care-giving in respect of both household members 
who are ill and orphaned children’ (ibid: 61-4, 84).  ‘To the extent that the old 
age pension must be understood in terms of a transfer to households, and not 
only elderly individuals’, then paying pensions to elderly women but not men is 
reasonable in that women are more likely to spend pension income in ways that 
                                                 
5 Note that Christian Roberts himself, and his co-applicants in Roberts, were not typical of the ‘group’ of means-
eligible men aged 60-64. 
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benefit poor dependents, such that the pension serves not just as a ‘safety-net for 
the poorest and most vulnerable people in our society’ but also as a ‘trampoline 
that enables many people in these households to jump over the barriers of 
economic and social exclusion’, as the Minister of Social Development is quoted 
as saying (ibid: 90).  
 
This line of argument is hazardous for the state.  First, having emphasized the 
benefits to the elderly of living with kin, the state now emphasises the costs in 
terms of ‘pension sharing’ for the support of pensioners’ dependents.  More 
fundamentally, is the disadvantaged ‘group’ that is being targeted through old-
age pensions to women aged 60-64 the women themselves or the women and 
their dependents?  The logic of the state’s case would require that the state 
provides some analysis of the disadvantage as well as the need experienced by 
people who are dependent on women aged 60-64 relative to the need and 
disadvantage experienced by people who are (or would be) dependent on men 
aged 60-64.  The state provides no such analysis or evidence.  It would seem 
that the state is unable to resist citing the poverty-reducing effects of giving 
pensions to women, even if this evidence sits poorly with the overall logic of the 
state’s defence of its policies. 
 
 
Normative and Empirical Justifications of 
Desert 
 
In post-apartheid South Africa, three major arguments have been put forward to 
justify the present or desired shape of social assistance programmes.  The first, 
enshrined (with conditions) in the constitution, is that citizens (and, the 
Constitutional Court found, permanent residents) have a right to income 
security.  This is an argument about social citizenship and – in the South African 
constitution – dignity.  It is an argument that quickly leads to proposals for a 
basic income grant.  The second argument is instrumental, and concerns the 
mitigation of poverty, whether for the good of the poor themselves or of society 
(perhaps because poverty is bad for democracy, as the ANC itself noted in the 
RDP (ANC, 1994: 4)).  Social assistance programmes should be assessed in 
terms of their efficiency in reducing poverty.  Van der Berg and Bredenkamp 
(2002) advocated the raising of the age limit on child-support grants on the basis 
of the poverty-reducing effects.  The state’s secondary argument in Roberts is a 
version of this general argument.  The state’s primary argument in Roberts is an 
example of the third general kind of argument: that some people, or groups of 
people, are more deserving than others because they faced (or face) worse 
opportunities to provide for themselves, i.e. they were (or are) relatively 
disadvantaged. 
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The third kind of argument has a long pedigree, and is morally defensible, but it 
is strange to find it used uncritically in the context of the post-apartheid South 
African welfare system.  It is strange because the post-apartheid state is using 
this argument to justify a welfare system that it inherited, and was designed in 
the 1920s and 1930s, in very different circumstances.  Both the design of the 
‘post-apartheid’ welfare state and the justification of this (as put forward by the 
state in Roberts) are in fact pre-apartheid ones!   By 1939, the welfare state 
provided for the deserving (white and coloured) poor because the elderly, 
disabled and single-mothers were the only (white and coloured) people who 
were unable to support themselves through work.  The state provided 
employment opportunities to unskilled, unemployed (white and coloured) men 
on the railways and through public works programmes.  In the early 2000s, the 
context is rather different.  Between four and eight million people are 
unemployed and only a tiny proportion of these have been given the opportunity 
to work through public works programmes or other job creation schemes.  Some 
of the unemployed, especially unskilled men in their 50s or early 60s, are 
probably ‘unemployable’ (Bhorat, 2000). 
 
The South African public shares a conception of the ‘deserving’ and 
‘undeserving’ poor.  But the public is more discerning than the state.  Surveys in 
Cape Town show that the elderly and sick are considered to be most deserving.  
But the unemployed are sometimes considered deserving: those who are 
unemployed through no fault of their own are considered deserving, whilst those 
who bear some responsibility for their unemployment (for example, because 
they lost their jobs due to dishonesty or unpunctuality) (Seekings, 2005, 2007).   
 
The state, unlike the public, has the responsibility of justifying precisely and 
clearly where it draws the line in terms of coverage by the social assistance 
system.  Justifying the exclusion of the non-poor – i.e. people who would not 
satisfy the existing means-test for an old-age pension – is easy.  Justifying the 
exclusion of poor people is harder.  In Roberts, the state accepts that the 
constitution requires it to realize progressively the right to income security, but 
argues that this should be done on ‘a holistic rather than a piecemeal basis’ 
(Pakade, 2006: 124).  If the basis of desert is to be disadvantage, then the state 
needs to conduct a general analysis of the distribution of need and disadvantage 
among different sections of the population.  Social assistance would then be 
extended to cover first those South Africans who are the most needy and 
disadvantaged of the various people currently excluded from social assistance.  
But there is no evidence that the South African state has begun to dissect how 
deserving are different groups of unemployed adults.  The current shape of the 
welfare state has not been justified in terms of an adequate analysis of need and 
disadvantage.   
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A holistic analysis would require three key components.  First, it would require 
an analysis of need: who is poor, i.e. what are the most appropriate groups for 
the categorization of poor people?  Secondly, it would require an analysis of 
disadvantage: are there historical factors explaining why poor groups of people 
are poor?  Evidence suggests that the factors that would need to be taken into 
account would include: the lack of skills (including, perhaps, linguistic 
competence) and credentials; the lack of social capital, i.e. the connections that 
are crucial to obtaining employment (and which are likely to be related to 
geographical location also); employment histories; age; and perhaps gender.  
These factors will often correlate with location.  (The real effects of race are 
likely to be mediated through the lack of skills and social capital, together with 
employment histories).  Thirdly, it would require an ordering of groups on the 
basis of need and disadvantage. 
 
If a basic income grant is rejected, then social assistance can only be extended 
through targeting specified groups.  Some of the factors causing disadvantage 
are not suitable for categorizing people into groups for the purpose of targeted 
social assistance.  For example, the administrative costs of assessing 
employment histories or social capital would be prohibitive, and there would be 
undesirable disincentives if education was used as a criterion.  Age, however, is 
clearly appropriate.  It is likely that a large number of men aged between 60 and 
64 would be identified as both needy and disadvantaged.  Unlike young men, 
they have no realistic prospect of ever finding employment; for them, 
unemployment is transitory only in the sense that they will cease to be 
unemployed when they finally become eligible for an old-age pension.  It is also 
likely that many men and women above the age of 50 would rank high in any 
ordering of disadvantage and need.  These are compelling arguments for 
reducing the age of eligibility for the old-age pension, whilst retaining the 
means-test, for both men and women.  Age is not the only appropriate criterion, 
however.  Given that disadvantage might correlate also with location, there 
might be grounds for having a lower age of eligibility for the old-age pension in 
some areas than others.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In its response to Roberts, the state offers a justification of gender and age 
discrimination in the old-age pension based on combination of conceptual and 
empirical claims. The state argues, using survey and census data, that elderly 
women are disadvantaged relative to elderly men, and this means that gender 
discrimination is an appropriate supplement to the means-test in assessing 
whether particular individuals count as deserving poor.  The state’s justification 
entails normative and methodological components. The normative interpretation 
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on what makes some poor people ‘deserving’ is defensible, but should be 
debated. By presenting an argument, the state has provided the basis for such a 
debate. The empirical methodology is also important, although the state itself 
applied it poorly in the specific context of Roberts. This methodology might, 
and probably should, be applied to the overall shape of the welfare state. 
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